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Post-Sale Restraints via Patent 
Licensing: A “Seedcentric” Perspective 
Peter Carstensen∗
The use of post-sale restraints on buyers of patented goods is 
an increasingly common strategy of patent holders.  The seller 
attaches a notice to the patented good or a good containing a 
patented component purporting to limit scope of what the buyer 
has bought and imposing explicit restraints on buyers’ freedom to 
resell the product or take other actions.  The patent community has 
sought to justify and explain these post-sale restraints based on an 
analogy to the right of real property owners to encumber such 
property with covenants that restrict future owners.  The key claim 
is that the patent owner has the right to divide the interests in the 
goods being sold and declare that only some rights were 
transferred.  This conception provides a basis to bind not only the 
party in privity but all others who come, or might come, into 
possession of this property.  Interestingly, it appears that only those 
with notice of the restraint can be bound.  This suggests once again 
the contractual origins of this claim. 
∗ Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School.  This paper grows out of the 
very useful discussion of patent licensing held at Fordham Law School’s annual 
Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal symposium in November 
2005. John Richards et al., Panel I: Monsanto v. Scruggs: The Scope of Downstream 
Licensing Restrictions, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1025 (2006).  In 
addition, I have drawn on comments made in two related presentations—one at New 
York University Law School and one to the Antitrust Law and Economics Seminar at the 
University of Wisconsin Law School.  Because many of the attendees at these various 
presentations expressed strong reservations about the ideas presented, I found those 
opportunities very helpful in testing and clarifying my analysis.  As an expert for the 
defendants, I was involved in two of the cases referenced or discussed in this article: 
Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc. v. Ottawa Plant Food, Inc., 283 F. Supp. 2d 1018 
(N.D. Iowa, 2003), and Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 342 F. Supp. 2d 568 (N.D. Miss. 
2004).  The analysis presented, however, relies entirely on publicly available materials 
including the public filings in those cases. 
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This expanded right to restraint use and resale destroys the 
vitality of the first sale doctrine in patent law, which was first 
announced in 1873.1  That doctrine held that the rights of the 
patent holder expired at the point when the patented good was sold.  
But the first sale doctrine only applied to a property right 
conception and never spoke to the right to enter into contractual 
restraints linked to the sale of patented property.  Indeed, such 
restraints are in fact commonplace in a variety of sales not 
involving patents.  In this alternative conception, the buyer by 
buying is said to agree to those limits.  Indeed, such agreements are 
now often inferred if the purchaser has actual or constructive 
notice of the limits.2  If the buyer breaches that contract including 
making sales or transfers that it had agreed not to make, the seller 
has a variety of contract remedies that it can invoke against both 
the seller and any buyer who induced a breach of the contract. 
A careful reading of the Federal Circuit’s opinion that created 
the modern foundation for the expansion of post-sale restraints 
shows that it derived the right to engage in such restraints from the 
contractual model and not from any inherent patent right.3  Indeed, 
the legal conceptual label is less relevant than the functional point, 
drawn from contract, that the seller must have a legitimate 
justification for the restraint.  Yet district courts, and the Federal 
Circuit itself, have lost sight of that crucial analytic point and its 
significance for the validity of such restraints.4  The expansive 
conception of this right to restrain buyers has lead courts to 
insulate unjustified exclusionary and exploitative conduct by 
sellers who happen to have patent rights from critical review on the 
merits except in a extreme circumstances.5
Broadly stated, the thesis of this Comment is all post-sale 
restraints are “contractual” in nature and therefore subject to 
 1 See Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453 (1873). 
 2 See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 3 See Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 4 See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir 2004); Pioneer Hi-
Bred Int’l, Inc. v. Ottawa Plant Food, Inc., 283 F. Supp. 2d 1018 (N.D. Iowa, 2003); 
Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 342 F. Supp. 2d 568 (N.D. Miss. 2004) (currently on appeal to 
the Federal Circuit). 
 5 See Monsanto Co. v. Baumgardner, No. 04-708 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 29, 2005) 
(unreported opinion, on file with the author). 
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review under both contract law and antitrust law.  Both legal 
regimes condemn unnecessary restraints on the freedom of the 
buyer.  But both also recognize that a wide variety of post-sale 
restraints can be lawful.  In general, legality turns on whether there 
is some legitimate venture between the parties or some feature of 
the transaction that warrants the limit on post-sale competition.  
This “ancillary restraint” analysis applies to both contract and 
antitrust law. 
When a patented product is sold, there is a further question of 
whether in some limited circumstance the interest of the patent 
holder in exploiting its rights could justify an otherwise unlawful 
restraint.  Given the long standing first sale doctrine, it is plausible 
that absent an express legislative authorization, no such right 
exists.  But if such a right were inferred from the overall phrasing 
of the patent code, the patent holder should not have unlimited 
discretion to select among the restraints it might employ.  Instead, 
given the general reliance on the open market, any post-sale 
restraint intended to exploit a legitimate patent interest should be 
the least intrusive, reasonably fitted to protecting the narrowly 
defined patent interest of the owner.  Moreover, the courts in 
inferring any right to impose post-sale restraints that only function 
to exploit patent rights need to delineate the scope of such rights 
with particular attention to the underlying goals of patent law.  
Those goals are to promote innovation in the “useful arts” with the 
minimum exploitation of the public needed to call forth innovation 
and with no more disruption of the overall economy than is 
necessary to achieve that goal. 
The use of patent rights by owners of patents on seeds or traits 
within seeds provides an illuminating set of contexts within which 
to examine these issues.  Over the last two decades the seed 
industry has developed a great number of patented genetic 
modifications to key crops.  In the case of hybrid seeds, the 
resulting plants will not produce seeds that are “true” to type.  So, 
the patent holder faces no risk of “misappropriation” of its patented 
genetics.  On the other hand, other seeds are the result of 
inbreeding and the resulting plants produce seeds that are true 
copies of the original.  The buyer of such seeds can reproduce 
copies at will and absent some constraint can either re-plant or sell 
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the seeds.  This comment is “seedcentric” in its focus because there 
are several examples of the use of post-sale restraints on seeds that 
illustrate the range of goals that such requirements can serve.  The 
issues and analysis presented here have, however, much broader 
application.  They go to the heart of the authorization of patent 
holders to impose post-sale restraints on the operation of the 
competitive market.  The ultimate hypothetical would ask whether 
a notice posted on a new car can restrain the buyer from reselling 
the car except with the manufacturer’s consent.6
The Discussion starts, in Part I, with a proposed framework for 
understanding the post-sale rights of sellers of goods.  This 
framework rests on the key premise that naked restraints on 
alienation are, like all other naked restraints, inefficient and 
economically undesirable in general.  The framework rests on the 
lengthy experience of open markets that inherent rights (property 
type claims) are unnecessary to providing a legal basis to protect 
most legitimate post-sale interests of the seller.  The addition of 
patent rights does not change this calculus except in a very limited 
situation.  The policy questions that courts ought to ask in that 
context are 1) whether they can re-write the patent laws to expand 
their coverage, and 2) if so, how expansive a right ought to be 
granted.  Part II applies this framework, first, to the case that 
reasserted the right to post-sale restraints for patented goods and 
then to three cases involving seed company use of expansive, post-
sale restraints on the buyer’s freedom of action.  Part III concludes 
the analysis by re-examining the problem of post-sale restraints in 
the context of patented goods. 
I. A CONTRACTUAL-INHERENT RIGHT MODEL OF PATENT RIGHTS 
In ordinary commerce, when a good is sold the buyer takes full 
and complete possession, dominion, and control of the good.  This 
includes the right to resell it and to use it in any way that the buyer 
sees fit.  There is a powerful economic logic behind such a policy.  
If the seller can limit the rights transferred, this creates a serious 
 6 Books published prior to the imposition of the first sale doctrine in copyright actually 
had on the cover page such a restraint.  It was clearly intended to weaken or destroy the 
market in used books. 
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inhibition on the market.  Subsequent buyers require notice of 
these limits and a registry would be needed to let third parties 
ascertain what rights they can or might acquire from such a seller.7  
The original buyer must also refer to the limits in the purchase 
document to determine what use it can or may make of the good 
that it has purchased.  In contrast, warranties, and other similar 
post-sale obligations are the result of contracts that focus on 
specific commitments by the seller to the buyer.  The market for 
goods would be seriously undermined and transaction costs driven 
up greatly if sellers were allowed to limit the rights sold as a matter 
of right.8
Of course, there are a number of situations in which the owner 
of goods will lease or rent those goods to others.  The prototypical 
situation gives the owner substantial obligations for the property 
and right to its return in good working order.  As the “lease” 
becomes a device that manipulates title and other formal indicia, 
but confers on the possessor the effective full right of use, a 
functional analysis would label that a sale even if the tax or 
corporate accounting laws might give it a different name.  It 
should, nevertheless, be acknowledged that there are likely to be 
some boundary problems between the renting or leasing of 
property and its sale.  In general that distinction makes no 
difference because in either case any restraint on the user/buyer’s 
use of that property is a matter of contract and so subject to both 
the limits of contract law itself as well as those of antitrust law.  In 
fact, the Clayton Act’s section 3 expressly addresses such restraints 
 7 In the case of real property, title recording, a costly and complex process, provides 
the basis on which buyers or third parties, e.g., lenders, can ascertain the nature of the 
interests of the nominal “owner.”  While there are procedures for recording liens and 
judgments, the burden and expense of expanding this recording process to encompass a 
comprehensive system of fractured interests in goods would be overwhelming. 
 8 This was the core rational for the Supreme Court decision in Dr. Miles Medical Co. 
v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911) that is popularly thought to have 
condemned all resale price maintenance.  In fact, the Court rejected Dr. Miles’ claim of 
an inherent right to control the resale of his patented medicines but acknowledged that 
such restraints would be lawful if in furtherance of a legitimate objective. Id. at 400–06.  
But the pleadings showed that Dr. Miles only sought to create and enforce a retailer’s 
cartel. Id. at 407.  See Peter Carstensen, The Competitive Dynamics of Distribution 
Restraints: The Efficiency Hypothesis Versus the Rent Seeking Alternatives, 69 
ANTITRUST L.J. 569 (2001). 
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and condemns them whenever they may “substantially lessen 
competition or tend to create a monopoly.”9
Thus, when the owner of a good, whether patented or 
unpatented, parts with the possession and control over that good, 
its right to restrain the new possessor stems from contract law and 
not from some inherent right.10  This suggests that when a patent 
holder sells a good, it too should be constrained with respect to 
post-sale rights to those it establishes via a lawful contract with the 
buyer.  Thus, the post-sale restraint involving a patented good 
should, in general, be treated like any other contract.  It does not 
implicate the patent or patent right.  Its validity is contingent on 
there being a valid basis for the contract itself.  This also implies 
that the contract defines who is bound by such a restraint. 
The doctrine of exhaustion of patent rights (the first sale 
doctrine) has existed for more than 130 years.11  But its 
dimensions remain unclear.12  The basic problem is that in a few 
limited post-sale contexts, an unrestrained buyer may invade the 
inherent rights of the patent owner in ways that only a restraint on 
buyer conduct can control.13  Such a restraint only serves to 
increase the patent owner’s reward beyond that which it could 
derive from the sale directly.  In many other situations, the patent 
owner and the buyer have a legitimate joint interest in some aspect 
of the transaction that warrants some further contractual restraint.  
Current law has muddled these two concepts with the result that 
the inherent right claim has come to dominant the contractual right 
theory when patents are involved.  This is understandable given the 
 9 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2000). 
 10 See Dr. Miles Medical Co., 220 U.S. at 405; Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, 
Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
 11 See Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453 (1873). 
 12 See, e.g., B. Braun Medical, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, 124 F.3d 1419, 1426–28 
(Fed. Cir. 1997); PSC, Inc. v. Symbol Technologies, Inc., 26 F. Supp. 2d 505 (W.D.N.Y. 
1998); cf., Virginia Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Corp., 133 F.3d 860, 869–71 (Fed. Cir. 
1997). 
 13 Cf., Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176 (1980) (patent 
covered process applying generally available chemical for which there was no other 
commercial use; patent holder given the right to bar others from sale of chemical as 
contributing to infringement by the buyer). 
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greater rights that a patent owner has whenever the dispute can be 
cast as one involving invasion of inherent rights. 
Post-sale contracts involve a large number of transactions.  
Warranty and other service commitments are obvious examples.  
But the business considerations can be much more complex.  The 
producer and buyer of the good may want to enter into a joint 
venture to distribute the good in particular areas or to particular 
classes of consumers.  In such a transaction, both the buyer and 
seller face risks of opportunism from the other party.  Hence, 
mutual restraints may be appropriate.  The seller may have 
concerns about free-riding and the failure of the buyer to incur the 
costs necessary to develop and serve the target market while the 
buyer may be concerned that it will be unable to recover its costs 
in developing that market if the seller is free to sell to others who 
might make entry after the market is developed.  Patent law is 
particularly sensitive to these interests recognizing both territorial 
and field of use licenses.  Such agreements make economic sense 
whenever the licensee is incurring risks and making investments to 
develop the market for the patented good. 
In contrast, in a few instances the only interest of the patent 
holder is to exclude post-sale activity that arguably involves the 
buyer’s own use of the patent but which also involves the 
replication of the patented good.  This also can occur in the context 
of copyrighted goods.14  In such cases, on the one hand the rights 
owner has in fact sold the good but at the same time faces the 
problem of replication in ways that increase the value of the good 
to the possessor.  It would be an obvious case of infringement if 
the possessor sells the duplicated good to others.  That deprives the 
patent owner of a sale or royalty on a sale.  The harder case occurs 
only when the buyer replicates the product for its own use.  Here 
the question is whether the buyer has not inherently acquired that 
right when it buys the good.  As the Supreme Court observed: “the 
patentee . . . receives the consideration for its use and he parts with 
the right to restrict that use.”15
 14 Computer software is easily copied and so a buyer can replicate its initial purchase 
for its own use.  Arguably, a copyright based right to restrict such copying for one’s own 
use acts to protect the right to sell multiple copies. 
 15 Adams, 84 U.S. at 456. 
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In looking at this problem, it is important to have criteria for 
judging the scope of any right being asserted.  Professor Jim Chen 
has recently suggested that the touchstone for interpreting the 
scope of rights conferred by specific statutes involving innovation 
and the creative arts is the underlying constitutional provision.16  It 
establishes the goal of patent law as “Progress of Science and the 
useful Arts.”17  In application, this goal would suggest that only 
narrowly focused rights should exist in the post-sale world with 
respect to the use made by a buyer.  Indeed, absent congressional 
authorization one might argue that no such rights should exist.  It is 
Congress and not the courts that should define the rights that it 
wishes to grant in order to stimulate innovation.  Thus, like any 
other grant to exploit the public, the patent laws should be 
narrowly construed.18
In sum, the general framework is that post-sale, a patent holder 
should have all the rights to enter into contracts with the buyer that 
any other seller has.  Contract law defines the scope and limits of 
such rights with antitrust law providing a further outer boundary 
where there is a creditable threat to the competitive process.  Patent 
rights as such have no bearing on this framework.  Only in the very 
limited case where the buyer has obtained some apparent ability to 
replicate the invention for its own internal use should the law even 
consider whether the patent owner’s interest in naked exploitation 
should provide a basis to restrict the buyer’s freedom.  Assuming 
the courts have the authority, sua sponte, to create such a right, the 
question is what limit should exist on the privilege of restraining 
the buyer’s freedom?  The right being protected provides a 
measure of the appropriate restraint—it should be no more 
restrictive than necessary to protect the legitimate interest of the 
 16 Jim Chen, The Parable of the Seeds: Interpreting the Plant Variety Protection Act in 
Furtherance of Innovation Policy, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 105 (2005). 
 17 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.  Although I have heard the suggestion that this provision 
was in fact reconsidered and rejected at the constitutional convention and only remained 
in the published draft as a result of a printer’s error, there is, so far as I can tell, no basis 
for such a claim. 
 18 “Intellectual property” is a label that conceals a central “public choice” problem.  
The only rights that exist are those given by law.  Such rights are therefore a target for 
special interest groups seeking to maximize their wealth.  For this reason alone, courts 
should construe all such legislatively created rights strictly to minimize the adverse effect 
of such “rent seeking” behavior. 
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patent holder in its patent rights.  This in turn does require the 
courts to be more explicit about the scope of the right to exploit 
buyers that patent holders should have. 
II. THE CASES 
This part focuses on the foundation case that subsequent courts 
regard as reestablishing the right of patent holders to impose post 
sale restraints as an inherent part of the sale of patented goods, and 
three seed related cases that reflect a range of circumstances in 
which patentees sought to apply the doctrine.  In each instance, the 
focus of the analysis is on the merits of the restraints in terms of 
the public interests in open markets and the protection of the 
legitimate interests of patent owners. 
A. The Foundation Decision—Mallinckrodt 
The modern foundation case said to recognize the expanded 
rights of patent holders to use license restrictions in the post-sale 
context is Mallinckrodt v. Medipart.19  The patent holder claimed 
that although it “sold” the product, buyers had to agree to dispose 
of it or return it to the patent holder after a single use.  The alleged 
infringer had obtained these products from the buyers and refilled 
them so that they could be reused. 
The core of the Mallinckrodt court’s justification for the 
restriction on reuse was that there were public safety and product 
liability reasons for it.  Specifically the product involved the use of 
radioactive materials, and the claim was that the reuse might result 
in serious harms if the specific device was not properly recharged 
as well as potential product liability for the patent holder-
manufacturer.  The patent holder asserted that the defendant had 
induced patent infringement by the buyers.20  Moreover, it 
characterized its contractual restriction as a “field of use” 
restriction authorized by patent law.21
 19 976 F. 2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 20 Id. at 703. 
 21 Id. 
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The Federal Circuit upheld the restriction relying on a mixture 
of old patent decisions and the Supreme Court’s Sylvania decision 
that had expanded the right of manufacturers to restrict distribution 
of their products.22  The central rational was that: “Patent holders 
should not be in a worse position, by virtue of the patent right to 
exclude, than owners of other property used in trade.”23  The 
opinion also cited to Tripoli v. Wella,24 a case the Supreme Court 
had cited with approval in Sylvania.  Tripoli had upheld a resale 
restraint on a hair product intended for professional use only 
because of its potential risks in the hands of ordinary consumers.25  
The rationale for that decision had been that the contractual 
restraint allowed the manufacturer to sell the product at a reduced 
price because of the reduction in the risk of product liability 
claims.26  Thus, the Federal Circuit’s rationale in Mallinckrodt is 
identical to that which the producer of an unpatented product could 
assert with respect to a cost saving restraint on opportunistic resale 
of the product.  The central issue in such a case is whether the 
claim is factually valid or simply a pretextual claim.27
An alternative hypothesis for Mallinckrodt’s restraint is that it 
sought to increase revenue by eliminating the potential for reuse by 
the buyer.28  This explanation would mean that the patent holder 
has claimed the right to compel buyers to buy new goods each time 
they needed to have the product even though these buyers already 
had purchased products that were in fact reusable.  If ordinary 
contract law applied, and if Mallinckrodt had market power in the 
 22 Id. at 705–07 (citing Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvannia, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 
(1977)). 
 23 Id. at 708. 
 24 Tripoli Co. v. Wella Corp., 425 F.2d 932 (3d Cir. 1970) (en banc). 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. 
 27 See, e.g., Eiberger v. Sony Corp. of America, 622 F.2d 1068 (2d Cir. 1980); 
Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29 (D.C. Cir. 2005).  See also Northwest 
Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 297 n.7 
(1985) (group refusal to deal based on membership rules of a legitimate joint venture is 
not per se illegal absent a showing that the refusal was pretextual). 
 28 There is a technical issue here as to whether the reuse constituted “repair” of the 
product or reconstruction.  Patent law permits the buyer to repair but not to reconstruct.  
The opinion evades this issue by reference to the limited license and asserts that the 
limitation necessarily deprives the buyer of the right to repair the product. See 
Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d. 700, 709 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
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market for these devices, then at least arguably its use of this 
contract term would be an unlawful exploitation of its dominance 
of that market.29  Indeed, the contract term itself, if only to serve 
this purpose, might be invalid under basic contract law.  It 
interferes with the rights of a buyer after the seller has parted with 
title, dominion and control over the product.  Moreover, it would 
clearly conflict with the command of Burke v. Adams. 
The Federal Circuit did not decide that Mallinckrodt’s 
legitimate justification was factually valid.  It only rejected the trial 
court’s “per se” condemnation of the restraint based on the first 
sale doctrine.  It remanded the case for further proceedings at 
which, presumably, the issue would be whether the evidence 
supported Mallinckrodt’s claimed justification.30  Thus, the 
foundation case despite its invocation of patent law and rights 
appears to rest on a conventional contract analysis that would 
apply regardless of the existence of patent and which would be 
subject to antitrust law to the extent that the restraint was 
unreasonable.  Unfortunately, no further proceedings were 
reported. 
In sum, the Mallinckrodt decision rested on the recognition that 
a patent holder has the same rights to contract with buyers that any 
other seller has.  The only patent aspect of the case was that 
Mallinckrodt has the right to claim that inducing breach of the 
contract is contributory infringement.  This does not change the 
underlying character of the case: Mallinckrodt was contending it 
had a valid contract restricting its customers from reusing the 
equipment; the defendant’s position was that the agreement was 
 29 Such a restraint is similar to tying in that the buyer is required to take something 
additional—a new product each time there is the need to reuse the product.  It reflects the 
use of market power in the product line to compel the buyer to accept a higher effective 
price for the good than would exist is a workably competitive market.  Thus, such a 
practice involves the prima facie use of market power and distorts the choices of buyers 
as well as limiting the market for services associated with the reuse of the patented good.  
Thus, such a restraint interferes with the competition on the merits.  Absent a non-
exploitative justification for such a restraint, it should be condemned as a naked restraint 
on competition. 
 30 84 U.S. 453 (1873).  One of the many anomalies of antitrust law is the courts rarely 
concern themselves with details such as identifying the party with the burden of pleading 
or offering evidence on an issue even though it should be obvious that the assignment of 
such obligations might facilitate the conduct of cases. 
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invalid.  If in fact the explanation for the agreement was that it 
impaired the rights of the buyer to make use of the goods 
purchased for the economic benefit of the seller, then such a 
restraint in a contract of sale would be invalid as an unreasonable 
restraint on alienation.  On the other hand, if Mallinckrodt’s 
explanation that the reason for the restraint was both to protect 
public health and reduce the cost of the product because the 
limitation avoided very substantial insurance/risk expenses was 
established, then the restraint would be valid regardless of the 
presence or absence of a patent.  On remand, the focus of the 
litigation would be on the merits of the justification for the 
restraint.  This would properly limit the authorization for post-sale 
restraints to situations where any seller could lawfully impose a 
restraint. 
B. Baumgardner—Choice of Forum as an Element of the Patent 
License 
Monsanto owns patents to genetic characteristics that make 
plants resistant to glyphosate, a powerful, broad spectrum 
herbicide.  If a farmer plants such seeds, she can then spray 
glyphosate over the top of the crop, eliminate weeds, and avoid 
more costly methods of protecting the crop from weeds.  Monsanto 
follows a number of substantive practices that seek to exploit the 
economic value of this trait.  It licenses a number of seed 
companies to include the trait in their seeds, but requires that each 
ultimate buyer of seed must agree to a “technology license” and 
pay a license fee.  For many years, Monsanto insisted that the fee 
be separately billed to the farmers, but eventually allowed the seed 
companies to combine the fee into the overall price of the product.  
The technology license imposes important restraints on the buyer.  
The most notable is that the farmer can not save and replant the 
seeds derived from the farmer’s own crop.  The merits of this 
restraint are the subject of various law suits and will be discussed 
subsequently in connection with the McFarling decision. 
Among other elements of this license is a forum selection 
clause.  The forum selected is that of the Federal District Court in 
St. Louis, Missouri where Monsanto’s headquarters are located.  
The clause both authorizes Monsanto to bring any proceeding for 
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breach of the license in that forum and requires the licensee to use 
that forum if it wants to contest any aspect of the license.  Such 
forum selection clauses are frequent features of contracts whether 
or not the contract involves a patented product or some other 
goods.  Different jurisdictions give greater or lesser deference to 
such clauses. 
A group of farmers who had purchased seeds with the 
Monsanto traits and who had therefore signed the technology 
license commenced class action law suits against Monsanto in 
various state courts.  The cases charged a variety of violations of 
state antitrust law.  Monsanto then filed its own lawsuit in the 
federal court in St. Louis contending that the farmer plaintiffs had 
violated the technology license by violating the forum selection 
clause.  It followed, Monsanto contended, that the licenses 
allowing the farmers to plant crops with Monsanto traits were void 
and so the farmers were infringing Monsanto’s patent.  Monsanto 
demanded that the court enjoin the farmers from continuing to 
raise those crops and award it damages for their infringement.31
In a carefully reasoned opinion the District Court rejected 
Monsanto’s claim that a forum selection clause was part of a patent 
license.32  The opinion recognized that forum selection could be an 
appropriate element of a contract of sale at least under the laws of 
some jurisdictions, but it refused to allow Monsanto to convert the 
right to make such a contract into a right to treat its breach as a 
voiding of the underlying transaction by which the patented 
genetic trait was sold to the farmer.  In addition, applying the law 
of Missouri, the court held that if the contract term involved a 
penalty of forfeiture of the right to use the patented goods, that 
would be unconscionable.  This left Monsanto with its basic 
contract claim to have the various cases transferred to the federal 
court in Missouri to the extent that the law of the forum states 
would recognize and enforce such a right.33
 31 Monsanto Co. v. Baumgardner, No. 4:04-CV00708-ERW (E.D. Mo. Mar. 29 2005). 
 32 Id.  Curiously, the opinion, a copy on file with the author, is no longer available on 
the district court web site nor is it reported in the WestLaw case index. 
 33 Ultimately, the plaintiffs decided to consolidate their cases against Monsanto in the 
federal court in St. Louis.  They have filed amended complaints that charge both state and 
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This decision is a good illustration of the application of the 
contract principle in the context of post-sale restraints.  Here the 
restraint was on the forum in which any dispute would be resolved.  
There are plausible arguments for adoption of such restraints as an 
incident to a sale although there are also some powerful counter 
arguments.  The central point is that such a provision has nothing 
to do with any unique aspect of the patent on the underlying 
product.  Rather, the issue is whether the contractual restraint is a 
lawful one under the law of the state in which the sale was made. 
C. Ottawa—Contractual Price Discrimination 
In Pioneer Hybrid Seed v. Ottawa34 a major corn seed producer 
obtained patents on some of the genetic material in its hybrid seeds 
and placed a notice on the bags that restricted the buyer’s use to 
planting the seed or using it for animal feed.  The intended 
implication of this restriction was that a buyer could not resell the 
seed.  Ottawa was in the business of supplying its customers with a 
variety of seed and agricultural chemicals.  It would, among other 
things, seek out farmers or dealers who had excess Pioneer seed or 
who would be willing to buy such seed from Pioneer at Pioneer’s 
price and then resell it to Ottawa for re-sale to other farmers.  
Because hybrid seed can not reproduce itself, there was no danger 
of Ottawa using the seed to create duplicates, it was only in the 
business of buying and reselling a commodity that happened to 
contain components that were patented. 
Such transactions are plausible economically under two 
possible business contexts.  First, if Pioneer had misallocated its 
seed inventories resulting in inadequate supply in a region and was 
unable to shift seed inventories efficiently, then an independent 
reseller would be able to engage in arbitrage—buying in one 
market and reselling in another.  Indeed, it may well be difficult 
and costly for a large organization such as Pioneer to identify 
where unmet demand existed and then move modest quantities of 
seed from one location to another.  Its dealers would have to report 
federal antitrust law violations. Schoenbaum v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., No. 4:05-
CV-01108-ERW (E.D. Mo. 2005). 
 34 283 F. Supp. 2d 1018 (N. D. Iowa 2003). 
CARSTENSEN_091706_CLEAN 9/17/2006  5:49:30 PM 
2006] POST SALE PATENT RESTRAINTS 1067 
that they had excess demand for specific types of seed for Pioneer 
to locate such seed in the hands of other dealers and work out the 
logistics of transfer including both the physical and financial 
details.  Hence, an independent business that started with orders 
from farmers seeking particular seeds could be more efficient in 
locating and reselling such seed. 
Second, if Pioneer gave volume buyers substantial discounts, 
there would be an incentive for such a buyer to buy the minimum 
necessary to get the lowest price if it could resell its surplus to a 
buyer that could in turn resell it to other farmers.  The second set 
of farmers would have been low volume direct buyers who would 
otherwise have paid a higher price for seed.  The independent seed 
merchant must, of course, take the risk of buying and reselling.  
For this kind of arbitrage to be economically viable, Pioneer must 
offer reasonably substantial volume discounts.  Such discounts 
would have to exceed the cost savings arising from volume sales 
because the independent re-seller will have to incur the expenses of 
moving relatively small lots of seed to various buyers.  Only if the 
price differential between large and low volume sales were 
substantial would it pay a third party to incur the costs and risks 
associated with such transactions. 
There are several reasons why, absent arbitrage among high 
and low volume buyers, a seller would favor large buyers with 
high discounts.  Such buyers are likely to be more sophisticated 
and so less likely to buy seed based solely on brand name or 
company reputation.  Instead, they are likely to identify the 
alternative seeds that would best serve their interests and then seek 
to get as competitive a price as possible.  Major buyers are also 
opinion leaders in their communities.  Hence, ensuring that such 
buyers are using a company’s product is likely to induce other, 
lower volume buyers to follow suit.  These considerations suggest 
that it is unlikely that the producer will eliminate discounts for 
volume buyers.  Instead, facing successful arbitrage it will be 
compelled to reduce the price of smaller quantities of seed until the 
difference is such that it ceases to be attractive for independent 
resellers to engage in arbitrage based on price differences. 
Both types of arbitrage improve market efficiency.  In the case 
of transfer of seed to meet actual demand, the independent dealer 
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can only do this profitably if it is more efficient than Pioneer.  
Hence, this lowers the social cost of getting the goods to the 
customers who desire them.  Meanwhile, Pioneer has collected the 
full royalty it sought and has avoided all other transaction costs.  In 
the case of arbitrage between high and low volume buyers, there is 
also an efficiency gain from society’s perspective.  Seed is moving 
to those who desire it at a lower price which will result in a larger 
volume of sales as low volume buyers are able to plant more of the 
more desirable crop.  Pioneer has not limited the volume it will sell 
to any particular buyer and so in effect has recognized that it is 
willing to make large volume sales at that price.  What it seeks to 
do is to extract extra income from the low volume buyer with 
relatively inelastic demand.  This is a purely exploitative 
maneuver. 
Basically, Pioneer asserted that it had the inherent right under 
patent law to restrict the buyer’s use of the seed.  It made no claim 
that these restrictions avoided risks of product liability or 
consumer harm.  Furthermore, given the nature of hybrid seed it 
had no basis to claim that buyers who did not plant would be able 
to reproduce its patented goods and sell them to third parties.  
Pioneer did assert that the arbitrage of seed disrupted its 
distribution system and interfered with its differential pricing 
scheme.  But it did not claim that there was some particular 
efficiency or economic justification to its system that required the 
limitation on resale.35  Essentially, it was asserting that it had the 
right to exploit its low volume customers by use of the re-sale 
restraint.  Moreover, it implicitly took the position that the 
inefficiency in its distribution system that produced misallocation 
of seed was a necessary element to its price discrimination scheme. 
Based on its expansive reading of Mallinckrodt,36 the District 
Court granted summary judgment to Pioneer holding that Ottawa 
had infringed the patent restriction by both buying and then 
reselling the seed.  This holding rested expressly on the assertion 
 35 Many scholars see the facts of Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 
36 (1977), and Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717 
(1988), as illustrating legitimate resale restraints based on risk of free-riding by retailers 
on the seller efforts of competitors. 
 36 283 F. Supp. 2d at 1031–35. 
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that the patent holder could “sell” only a limited interest in a good 
having patented components.  Thus, the notice on the bag disclosed 
to the buyer that the buyer obtained only the rights conferred by 
the notice and no others.37  But the same result would follow if a 
seller can by contract restrict the resale of its goods. 
The most plausible business explanation for Pioneer’s 
restrictions was to facilitate price discrimination among buyers of 
its seeds.  While price variance to the final customer is not illegal 
in itself,38 when the enterprise seeking to discriminate must get 
agreement from its customers not to resell the product, there is an 
obvious contract in restraint of trade.  As a matter of contract law, 
it is at least questionable whether the seller of a good can impose a 
resale restraint when the only justification is that the seller wants to 
charge others a higher price. 
As a matter of antitrust law, the initial question is whether there 
is a legitimate business justification for such a price discriminatory 
scheme.  In a recent decision, the Supreme Court has hinted that its 
historic opposition to price discrimination may be weakening.39  
Certainly, imposing higher prices on small buyers than would 
occur in an open market without any claim of special services or 
other gains to the buyer would seem to go beyond the outer limits 
 37 At the same time, the district court held that there should be a trial on damages and 
pointed out that the defendant’s experts had suggested that the patent owner had not lost 
any patent royalty because all its sales had been voluntary ones for which it had received 
the price it requested.  Hence, the defendant argued there was no basis to find that the 
patent owner had suffered any loss of its patent revenue entitlement. See id. at 1052–54. 
 38 Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2000), this discrimination 
would be unlawful if the price differences were imposed on distributors in competition 
with each other.  Because the disfavored farmers are seen as final buyers, even though 
they sell their corn crop in competition with the favored buyers, they have no basis to 
complain about the fact that they paid a higher price for seed than was cost justified. 
 39 See Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1281, 1292 (2006) (“it is 
generally recognized that [price discrimination] also occurs in fully competitive 
markets . . . .”).  Previously, the Court had indicated that price discrimination was 
inherently objectionable. See U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc., 429 U.S. 610 
(1977).  In context, the Court may only have meant that price discrimination does not of 
itself prove market power, a necessary element in unlawful tying.  Moreover, Richard 
Posner, a leader of the Chicago School of antitrust law and economics has recently 
declared that price discrimination is in fact very problematic in terms of its economic 
impact. Richard Posner, Vertical Restraints and Antitrust Policy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 229, 
235–37 (2005). 
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of such toleration.  Thus, given the lack of any non-exploitative 
explanation for the price differential, it seems more like that this 
restraint on the buyer’s freedom to use or resell the seed would be 
classified as a naked limit on competition and so per se unlawful. 
Pioneer’s price discrimination facilitating restraints were 
lawful, therefore, only because its patents conferred a right that the 
law otherwise condemns.  Moreover, the grant of right to Pioneer 
allowed it to extract from its low volume customers higher prices 
than would have been possible in an unrestrained market for such 
goods.  It achieves this result not based on the value of its patented 
product because it was willing to sell that product in volume at 
lower prices or leave it in inventory in areas where demand was 
too low.  The central question here is whether the interest in 
promoting innovation justifies this kind of inefficient, exploitation 
of sub-sets of buyers. 
D. McFarling—No Replanting of Patented Seed 
Monsanto licensed various seed companies to use its patented 
genetic material that made soybeans, corn and cotton resistant to 
glyphosate herbicide.  This initial license required that the licensee 
in turn impose a “technology agreement” on the farmers buying the 
seed that included a ban on replanting the seeds gathered from the 
crop.  Moreover, at the time of the McFarling case, farmers paid a 
separate “technology” fee to Monsanto along with the price of the 
seed itself.  This created a direct contractual relationship between 
the ultimate buyer and Monsanto giving Monsanto formal privity 
of contract with the farmer buyers.  Thus, Monsanto purported to 
reach through the licencee to the user of its technology that created 
herbicide resistant crops to command that the farmers be given 
only the right to plant a single crop with the seed.  Hence, farmers 
were compelled to buy new seed each year if they wanted the 
benefit of the resistance to herbicide. 
Monsanto spent a great deal of money enforcing this restraint.  
The patent right based argument for the replant limit is that both 
cotton and soybeans produce seeds that exactly reproduce the 
plant.  Therefore, allowing a farmer to save and replant such seeds 
would give the benefit of the patented characteristic without 
paying for that right.  The counter argument is that the farmer 
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bought the seed and that includes the capacity of the seed to 
reproduce itself.  If a farmer sold such seed, the case of patent 
infringement would seem convincing because in that case the seller 
was directly depriving the patent holder of the right to claim a 
license fee. 
Thus, Monsanto had two concerns.  First, the farmer might 
replant the seed, and second, the farmer might sell the seed.  
However, its no-replant restriction does more than require payment 
for saved seed used or sold for replanting.  It prohibits replanting 
altogether and thereby requires the farmer to buy new seed for his 
own land and not compete with seed companies in the sale of seed 
that is a good substitute for the seed companies’ own seed.  Hence, 
the focus of protection is on the seed producer and not the 
collection of royalties whenever the patented trait is either used 
(replanting) or sold.  The question is what rights should Monsanto 
retain with respect to the post-sale use by the buyer of the seeds 
purchased? 
The comparative economics of the situation are roughly these.  
New seed prices based on the higher value put on certified seed 
(guaranteed quality from a seed company) might be $17 a bag plus 
a patent license fee charged by the patent owner ($8) for a total 
cost of, hypothetically, $25 a bag for certified soybean seed.  If a 
farmer saves seed, the opportunity cost is the price of such seed 
sold for processing, say $6 a bag.  In addition, the farmer has to 
have the seed cleaned and tested by a seed cleaner in order to be 
assured that the seed will be readily usable for plantingBthis might 
add another $2 to the cost.40  If the farmer also pays the patent 
owner the license fee for each bag used in re-planting, the total 
costs would be, on these hypothetical figures, about $16 a bag or a 
saving of about $9 per bag.  Thus, the specific form of the license 
involved in this situation increases the buyer’s costs by 36% over 
the hypothetical alternative.  Moreover, the patent holder gets no 
more from its more costly system than from the less costly one.  
 40 In the case of cotton, it appears that cleaning is an absolute necessity for use while in 
the case of soybeans it is highly recommended and usual. 
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The beneficiaries are the seed company licensees who do not have 
to compete with saved seed.41
If the farmer sells the seed, presumably the price will be less 
than certified seed since the farmer selling “brown bag” seed can 
not provide the same level of assurance of quality.  The central 
point is that saved seed provides a cap on the pricing freedom of 
sellers of certified (new) seed.  That cap relates to the price of the 
seed as seed.  As such it is independent of the price of the trait 
components for which a separate price can or might be charged.  If 
the goal of the patent law were to protect the interest of patent 
owners and if the law were to take an expansive view of that right, 
i.e., that the patent owner is entitled to claim separate 
compensation for each reuse of its genetic trait by the buyer, then 
the right of the patent holder would extend no further than 
claiming compensation for seed saved and either replanted or sold.  
After all, the patent holder had already made the prior decision to 
sell the patented trait embedded in a seed that would reproduce.  
Hence, the patent holder has already waived any right to absolutely 
refuse others the right to use or benefit from the invention.  The 
central issue is the scope of discretion given to the patent holder in 
seeking to collect from buyers who either reuse or sell the results 
of the use of the patented good. 
Despite the obvious exploitation of buyers by this form of 
license, the Federal Circuit found no objection to it.42  In the case, 
it appeared that the farmer had not sold any of the saved seed, but 
only saved and replanted seeds originally purchased from 
Monsanto or one of its licensees.  The court did object to the 
liquidated damages element of the license.  Thus, demonstrating 
that such licenses are more like contracts whose terms can be 
reviewed on their merits.  Instead of a very punitive measure of 
damages, the court ordered that there be a focused inquiry into 
 41 The seed cleaner can perform a role very similar to the new seed producer in 
collecting the license fee.  Indeed, in the UK, this is currently done.  Moreover, whether 
or not the farmer is subject to a no-replant or a pay the fee to replant policy, the patent 
holder will have a substantial policing cost especially if the license fee is substantial.  
There is no good reason to believe that the no-replant policy involves appreciably 
different policing costs than would a “fee for replant” policy. 
 42 Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
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Monsanto’s actual damages.43  Other cases involving this 
restrictive license are pending in the Federal Circuit and in state 
courts.44
Once again one might ask what is the justification for this 
restriction.  Generally, as noted, a patent holder can make a 
plausible argument that it is being deprived of its entitlement to 
compensation for the use of its patented good.  Having sold the 
good, it can not plausibly argue that it does not intend to make 
such sales in the future.  From this perspective, it is using its right 
to exclude to claim a right to be compensated for the quantity 
saved and replanted arising from a lawful purchase of seed.  
Nothing in the patent law as written specifically authorizes a patent 
holder to impose a post-sale claim of this sort.45  Only by reading 
such a right into the statute can the courts impose any obligation on 
the farmer saving seed. 
Assuming that the courts can imply such a right, it is important 
to look at the specific restriction imposed.  In the case of seeds, the 
no-replant policy serves the interest of the patent licensees by 
eliminating saved seed competition, and not the narrowly defined 
interest of the patent holder.  Moreover, the seed companies would 
have a substantial incentive to standardize on the Monsanto genetic 
system and not encourage the development of any of the other 
systems available.  Competition among patented technologies 
would be likely to produce—and indeed in other genetic areas has 
produced—a substantial reduction in prices.46  Similarly, a no-
replant policy would be among the additional restraints that would 
be likely to be competed away. 
 43 Id. at 1344–52 
 44 Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 342 F. Supp. 2d 568 (N.D. Miss. 2004) (currently on 
appeal to the Federal Circuit) (similar facts as McFarling with respect to no-replant 
claim; challenges to the validity of the patents themselves and claims of patent misuse 
and antitrust violations); Complaint, Larsen v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., CA No. 
LACV032776 (Dallas County, Dist. Ct., Iowa) (alleged conspiracy among seed 
companies to use the license provision to eliminate competition). 
 45 It would appear that a more creditable case might be made that sale of saved seed 
constitutes infringement of the patent since the seller is now directly profiting from the 
sale of a good containing the patented element. 
 46 DANIEL CHARLES, LORDS OF THE HARVEST 199 (2001). 
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Today, the only commercially viable type of herbicide resistant 
genetic system is Monsanto’s.  Moreover, it is now present in over 
80% of the soybeans used as seeds.  This means that Monsanto 
through the expanded licensing rights recognized in McFarling can 
also control any additional genetic changes in those seed stocks 
through its conditional licenses.47  Indeed, the rationale of the 
McFarling decision would permit Monsanto to impose limits on 
the marketing of soybeans themselves.  For example, it could 
require that farmers sell only to a buyer that Monsanto had 
licensed.  This would allow Monsanto to tax the sale value of the 
crop as well.48  Already, Monsanto is appropriating most of the 
wealth created by its genetic innovation and under McFarling 
might seek to appropriate the wealth of the farmers as well.49
III. POST-SALE RESTRICTIVE LICENSING-AN INHERENT RIGHT? 
The initial position of the Federal Circuit in Mallinckrodt was 
that patent holders should have rights comparable to those of any 
other producer of a product.50  This included the right to sell the 
product subject to contractual limits on the buyer’s freedom.  Such 
limitations would therefore be reviewable under both contract and 
antitrust law for their legality and reasonableness.  However, a 
gradual transformation has occurred in which a right comparable to 
that recognized generally in vertical distribution law has moved 
toward an inherent and unreviewable right of the patent holder.  
This transformation rests on a failure to distinguish between the 
general interest of a producer in restraints that further its legitimate 
business interests and a specific claim that the restraint is essential 
to protecting an economic interest of the patent holder in exploiting 
 47 Whether and how much Monsanto has actually limited the development or addition 
of other characteristics to seed stock with its genetic material is not established on the 
public record so far as I know. 
 48 Cf., Atl. Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357 (1965); FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 393 U.S. 223 
(1968). 
 49 See José B. Falck-Zepeda et al., Surplus Distribution from the Introduction of a 
Biotechnology Innovation, 82 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 360 (2000); José B. Falck-Zepeda et 
al., Rent Creation and Distribution from Biotechnology Innovations: The Case of Bt 
Cotton and Herbicide-Tolerant Soybeans in 1997, 16 AGRIBUSINESS 21 (2000). 
 50 Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
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its rights.  The four cases profiled in Part II illustrate the range of 
issues and are suggestive of the need to make a careful distinction 
between the two bases for restraint as well as developing criteria 
for judging the merits of any restraint that rests on exploitation. 
The Baumgardner decision is a good application of 
Mallinckrodt in that it focused on the restraint as a contractual 
agreement that might or might not be lawful.51  The issue is 
whether the law of contract of the state in which that contract was 
made permits the kind of forum selection clause that was 
employed.  As in Mallinckrodt the key question turns on the issue 
of contractual validity.  Such agreements may reduce and facilitate 
the enforcement of patent rights, but that is not a unique function 
to such agreements.  Rather, they are used generally in business 
transactions and the law speaks generally to their validity or 
invalidity.  Upholding or rejecting the validity of that clause has no 
direct effect on the validity of the patent or the rights of the patent 
holder in respect to the patent.  As such, the restraint is not a 
functional incident of the patent but rather an incident of the sale of 
goods having patented components. 
The Ottawa case offers the first kind of distinction.52  Here, as 
suggested earlier, the restraints on resale serve no legitimate 
interest in efficient marketing of the seed itself nor do they protect 
any interest in the patented goods themselves.  Indeed, to the 
extent that resale moves seed from areas of surplus to areas of 
need, the results are both efficient and serve the economic interest 
of the patent holder.  Blocking such transactions makes sense only 
because it facilitates price discrimination among buyers in which 
the goal is to exploit low volume buyers by charging them a higher 
price than a standard commodity market would support.  Such 
exploitation can be justified as a patent right if, as Professor Chen 
has argued, the constitutional goal is to maximize the revenue for 
patent holders.  But the law has been clear that in fact 
maximization is subject to a variety of constraints concerning the 
method of exploitation.  Indeed, the goal of further innovation 
 51 Monsanto Co. v. Baumgardner, No. 04-708 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 29, 2005) (unreported 
opinion, on file with the author). 
 52 Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc. v. Ottawa Plant Food, Inc., 283 F. Supp. 2d 1018 (N. D. 
Iowa 2003). 
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should focus on the least cost to society necessary to obtain the 
desired level of innovation.  Moreover, there is an implicit and 
questionable assumption that precise levels of revenue have a 
direction causal correlation with innovative efforts. 
The central policy question becomes whether there is any 
general justification for the kind of price discrimination observed 
in Ottawa that should authorize patent holders to engage in such 
exploitive conduct when it would be unlawful for other businesses 
to engage in the same conduct.  In assessing that issue, one concern 
should be that the patent holder is discriminating against one set of 
buyers and in favor of another.  That is, it is tipping the economic 
balance in downstream markets such that the low volume buyer is 
“subsidizing” the high volume buyer beyond the level that an 
efficient market in seed would permit.  Further, the producer has in 
fact stood willing to sell its product at the lower price to the 
volume buyer which in itself suggests that the patent holder was 
satisfied with that price.  Indeed, arbitrage will result in an 
increased volume of sales for the patent holder thus restoring to it 
some part of the lost profits from its lower volume, but higher 
priced sales.  Lastly, as the opportunity to exploit existing rights 
expands the incentive to allocate resources to developing more 
sophisticated exploitation systems rather than to increased 
innovation is a real possibility. 
The foregoing considerations argue strongly against allowing a 
patent holder to engage in price discrimination through the use of 
post-sale restraints on the freedom of a buyer to resell the product.  
This would not, as noted several times, eliminate all price 
differences where there are cost factors that allow differential 
prices within or among market areas or types of buyers.  What is 
being suggested is that only those price differences that arise from 
the markets for the goods can be exploited to the benefit of the 
patent holder.  There is no good policy reason to impose on some 
sub-set of buyers a special obligation to reward the patent holder.53
 53 It merits renewed emphasis that the analysis is different if the licensee is developing 
a market or sub-market for the patent holder and there are risks of arbitrage or “free-
riding” that would undercut such a joint enterprise.  In those situations, territorial or 
customer restraints facilitating price differences could be lawful, if reasonably necessary 
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Seeds that reproduce themselves as in the McFarling case 
present a more difficult challenge.54  Here the patent holder can 
more plausibly argue that the buyer gets the benefit of replicating 
the patented trait in the absence of some restraint.  On the other 
hand, the buyer of such seed only gets the benefit of that inherent 
characteristic.  So the restraint on saving seed directly conflicts 
with the basic technological facts.  Certainly, if the farmer sells 
such seed to another farmer, that would constitute a loss to the 
patent holder of either a sale or royalty on a sale.  Such sales would 
constitute infringement.  But when the farmer simply saves and 
replants the seed, the question is what rights does a buyer acquire 
when buying a commodity that is known to reproduce itself. 
One answer is that it is for Congress and not the courts to 
decide what rights the patent holder should have in such cases.  
After all, the patent holder has chosen to sell the product rather 
than insist on its right of exclusivity.  In other contexts such as 
performance of music55 and the saving of seed protected by the 
Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970 (PVPA),56 Congress has 
chosen either to impose a compulsory license with a set royalty 
(recordings of music) or to authorize the continued use of the 
product by the buyer even though the buyer as duplicated the 
product (the PVPA).  On this basis, it should be clear that if 
Congress were to address this issue, its resolution may well 
involve some kind of sharing of rights.  Absent specific instruction 
from Congress, therefore, the courts cannot be sure what rights 
should be granted and so should not presume to write such 
legislation.57
to protect legitimate interests of the joint enterprise, whether or not patents were involved 
in any way. 
 54 Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir 2004). 
 55 See 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2000) (authorizing recording on songs if anyone has already 
recorded the song upon payment of a set royalty). 
 56 Pub. L. No. 91-577, 84 Stat. 1542 (1970) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 7 U.S.C.). 
 57 There is also a strategic reason for this approach.  Seed companies would have strong 
incentives to lobby Congress for a clarification of their rights.  Such concentrated and 
well organized interests are likely to have considerable influence on the legislative 
process.  At the same time, other stakeholders are more likely to have the capacity to 
respond to such legislative initiatives in a way that is not feasible if they must seek 
legislative reversal of a sweeping judicial grant of rights.  In this latter case, the powerful, 
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Although the foregoing might be the most logical way to 
proceed, the courts and particularly the Federal Circuit appear 
reluctant to see patent holders deprived to what the judges think 
are their general entitlements.  The McFarling case is a good 
example of this sympathy and its basis in the perception that the 
farmer has acted unfairly to deprive the patent holder of its 
royalty.58  Thus stated, the scope of the entitlement that provides 
the basis for any restraint becomes clear.  The patent holder has 
already voluntarily parted with the patented good.  Its only 
remaining interest as a patent holder is to be compensated for the 
use made of the good. 
The issue becomes the scope of the contractual restraint that 
might be imposed to protect that interest.  As the analysis of the 
Monsanto no replant policy has shown, all seed companies stand to 
gain as result of the policy.  This goes beyond the narrow interest 
of Monsanto in seeking compensation for saved seed.  Indeed, the 
policy at least implicitly offers all seed companies the opportunity 
to avoid technological competition if they standardize on 
Monsanto’s herbicide resistant trait.  Their interest in maintaining 
the price of seed and increasing their sales volume as a direct result 
of eliminating the saving of seed creates powerful incentives to 
join the Monsanto program and avoid technological competition 
because such competition is likely to lead to both price cutting and 
the waving of onerous conditions such as the ban on saving seed. 
This analysis suggests that the guiding principle in examining 
such post-sale restraints on replication is whether they are 
narrowly tailored to protect the interest of a patent holder as a 
patent holder.  If, however, the no replant policy is more restrictive 
than necessary to achieve that goal, it would impose unnecessary 
costs on the buyers and create avoidable risks to the overall 
process of innovation because of its incentives.  In the case of 
saved seed, there is evidence that less restrictive alternatives exist 
that could be used.  In particular, farmers wanting to replant saved 
seed can pay a royalty directly to Monsanto for that right based on 
the amount of seed they save and replant.  Indeed, as noted earlier, 
concentrated interests need only work to frustrate legislative action which is an easier 
task. 
 58 363 F.3d 1336. 
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most farmers wanting to save seed will use a seed cleaning service 
to clean and test the seed.  Such a service can provide a more 
centralized point to collect any fees.  This is the practice in the 
United Kingdom already.  So it is not merely a hypothetical 
response. 
The more general conclusion is that if the courts are going to 
fashion expansions of patent rights, they should do so guided by a 
careful definition of the right that inheres in the patent holder and 
then examine the means used to enforce that right to see whether it 
is no more invasive than reasonably necessary to protect the right.  
To go beyond that narrow authorization in the post-sale context is 
to allow the patent holder to use the patent right to frustrate the 
workings of the market to the detriment of buyers and to the 
overall process of innovation. 
CONCLUSION 
The problem of post-sale restraints is one part of a much larger 
set of issues concerning the appropriate scope and nature of the 
patent system.  There are more fundamental questions about the 
kinds of “inventions” being patented as well as the uses being 
made of patents in various contexts.  The ultimate plea of this 
Article is that it is time for those who oversee the patent system 
both in the courts and in Congress to recognize that the grant of 
patent rights confers the opportunity to tax the economy.  As such, 
it is essential that any taxation be reasonably related to the goals of 
public policy and not just private avarice.  It is therefore fitting to 
close with Judge Easterbrook’s comment on another statute that 
granted rights to exploit the public: 
When special interests claim that they have obtained favors 
from Congress, a court should ask to see the bill of sale.  
Special interest laws do not have “spirits,” and it is 
inappropriate to extend them to achieve more of the 
objective the lobbyists wanted. . . .  What the industry 
obtained, the courts enforce; what it did not obtain from the 
legislature—even if similar to something within the 
exception—a court should not bestow. . . .  Recognition 
that special interest legislation enshrines results rather than 
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principles is why courts read exceptions to the antitrust 
laws narrowly, with beady eyes and green eyeshades.59
 
 59 Chicago Prof’l Sports L.P. v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 961 F.2d 667, 671–72 (7th Cir. 
1992). 
